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THE JUDGED AND THE JUDGING: 
LOCATING INNOCENCE 
IN A FALLEN LEGAL WORLD
M.E. Turpel*
Law, says the judge as he looks down his nose,
Speaking clearly and most severely 
Law is as I’ve told you before 
Law is as you know I suppose 
Law is but let me explain it once more 
Law is the Law
W.H. Auden1
There has never been any rule of law or practice limiting the right of a 
judge in court or in Reasons for Judgement from saying what he or she 
thinks should be said even though he or she may decide for any number 
of reasons not to criticize others who may also deserve critical attention.
Chief Justice Allan MacEachem2
The Law3, when detected to have failed, indeed in a most tyrannical and 
inexcusable way — by victimizing the victim and chastising the innocent — has 
responded most often not with repentance but with denial, self-forgiveness and, 
predominantly, rationalizing. Such is the twisted and now familiar story of the 
Marshall judges,4 MacKeigan v. Hickman5 and the Judicial Inquiry Committee6 
entrusted with the task of reviewing judicial conduct in the aftermath of the report 
of the Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution.7 A bifurcating
’Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Member Indigenous Bar Association.
1 Excerpt from Poem 48, Selected Poems (New York: Vintage Books, 1979) at 89-90.
2Chairperson, Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of the Inquiry Committee established pursuant 
to subsection 63(1 ) of the Judges Act at the Request of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia, August 1990 
[hereinafter the Inquiry Committee Report].
^While I realize academic wars are waged regarding how Law is defined jurisprudentially, I want to 
sidestep that controversy, and use “the Law” to connote the totality of expressions and justifications 
of the actors who are part of the legal system for their behaviour, doctrines and institutions. Pierre 
Bourdieu captures the Law’s character well in his recently translated Language and Symbolic Power 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) in the following: “...that the most vigorously rationalized law is never 
anything more than an act of social magic which works” (emphasis added, at 42).
follow ing R. v. Marshall(19SS), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 286 [hereinafter the Reference].
5[1989] 2 S.C.R. 796; (1989) 61 D.L.R. (4th) 688.
6The Inquiry Committee Report.
1Commissioners’ Report: Findings and Recommendations, vol. 1, Province of Nova Scotia, 1989 
[hereinafter the Royal Commission], at 23.
subterfuge has lurked throughout the saga: judging is judging, a realm where 
reproof is both alien and illegal; when no law delimits judgment and discretion is 
both absolute and the Law.
I will not reconstruct the facts of the Marshall matter as they are easily 
accessible,8 but will instead consider one narrow aspect -  how the legal system 
responded to the suggestion that the Marshall Reference judges acted improperly 
in their comments that the innocent Marshall was responsible for his mistreatment, 
that he was a liar and a thief, and that if his case revealed any miscarriage of 
justice it was more apparent than real. It was outrage over these comments which 
lead the Attorney General of Nova Scotia to request that the Canadian Judicial 
Council appoint an Inquiry Committee to consider whether or not the judges 
should be removed from office and to “restore [public] faith and confidence in the 
highest court in this province.”9
To step outside of the internal web of legal discourse and doctrinal entangle­
ments so evident at these rare moments of self—reflection — a web that sets 
perimeters for the incredulity one should harbour toward a system that entraps the 
guilty and the innocent alike -  we witness the pathetic response of a fallen legal 
system. It is a “fallen” system not just for its sins but for its failure to repent. 
After the Report of the Royal Commission,10 the Canadian legal system lost the 
official innocence upon which it levitated. It was exposed as flawed even by its 
own, the judges turned Royal Commissioners, who detailed its failings. It was in 
this moment of imposed reflexive scrutiny on its conduct, of peer review and 
finally institutional retrenchment, that we witnessed the choice of the judicial 
actors to pursue the preservation of self-righteousness above all else.
In the aftermath of the Marshall affair, we are left asking: Can the Law ever 
look beyond itself? Can it ever grasp the inhumanity and tragedy of its errors? 
With the Marshall experience our most telling indicator, not likely. In the Inquiry 
Committee Report we see the Law recoiling from publicly perceived (and Royal 
Commission recorded) errors in the Marshall case with a vindication of itself: 
with a celebration of its judicial actors’ immunity from accounting for why they 
said what they said in the Reference, obfuscating comments that unleashed
^ or  an excellent overview and critical analysis of the entire Marshall affair, see HA. Kaiser,
“Legitimation and Relative Autonomy: The Donald Marshall Jr., Case in Retrospect” (1990) 10 
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 171. For a more focused critical analysis of the Report of the Royal
Commission, see M.E. Turpel “Further Travails of Canada's Human Rights Record: The Marshall 
Report” [1991] 3 International Journal of Canadian Studies 27.
unprovoked destruction in the life of an “accused” person.11
This sordid affair invites a literary comparison: Herman Melville’s engaging 
story of justice perverted on a warship called the “Bellipotent,” in Billy Budd, 
Sailor (An Inside Story).12 In Billy Budd, like Marshall, young Billy’s innocence 
is subverted to the martial code by which he must be judged. As a result, Melville 
tells us:
[i]n a legal view the apparent victim of the tragedy was he who had sought to 
victimize a man blameless... The essential right and wrong involved in the matter, 
the clear that might be, so much the worse for the responsibility for a legal sea 
commander, inasmuch as he was not authorized to deal with the matter on that 
primitive basis.13
In the case before us the final victim “in a legal view” is not, I would argue, 
any particular individual but the Law itself, that which has sought to “victimize a 
man blameless.” By daring to question the Law, Donald Marshall, Jr., constructed 
it as the victim before himself “in a legal view.” The focus shifted to an 
examination of the victimization of the perpetrator of the injustice in the Marshall 
affair and away from the real victim. The legal victim (the Law)14 must respond 
to its victimization (the Report of the Royal Commission which exposed the Law’s 
error) by vindicating itself. It does so, I will argue, by a convenient retreat into 
doctrinal rhetoric.
By constituting the Law as the apparent victim in the Marshall affair, an 
interesting reversal is effected -  the innocent once again become the target of 
aspersions and the Law is saved from criticism by the open doctrinal texture of 
Law talk.15 We see a retreat (or advance?) into the realm of doctrine with a
11It is hard to escape our prison house of legal language where an individual is constituted as an 
“accused person” rather than a person, like any person “inside” the system as opposed to (another - 
the outsider, the “accused” or “wrongfully convicted ” or “a Mikmaq.” It is neater conceptually and 
therefore emotionally to deal with the constructed “other” rather than a fully contextualized person, 
or rather, ourselves and our own lack of innocence as insiders to the Law. It is easier to reflect, in 
this case, on the supposed or ascribed crimes of the victim rather than the Law’s crimes.
12H. Melville, Billy Budd, Sailor, and Other Stories (New York, Penguin Classics, 1985), at 317. I will 
not recount the story here. I leave it to those who are unfamiliar to read it, indeed I encourage you 
to do so. Upon doing so, I also invite you to extend the present analogy by speculating as to a 
character in the Marshall affair corresponding to Jemmy Legs in Billy Budd.
13Ibid. at 380.
14Here I am in agreement with Michael Crawford, infra, that the Judicial Council Inquiry Committee 
cannot be viewed as anything other than “the judiciary judging itself ” (supra, note 2) as compared 
with any kind of genuine public review body.
15See, for example, the handy distance gained in Madam Justice McLachlin’s opinion in MacKeigan 
v. Hickman, supra, note 5, by retracing the origin of the doctrine of judicial immunity to Knowles trial 
(1692), 12 How St. Jr. 1167.
homily on judicial immunity in the Supreme Court of Canada in MacKeigan v. 
Hickman, and then again in the Inquiry Committee Report. By focusing on the 
doctrine of immunity, accountability is skirted and judges are secure in a “comfy 
zone” above reproach. Judges can be criticized for what they write but never 
asked to explain why they wrote what they did.16 Hence, any review of judicial 
error in reasons for judgement must take the form of an exercise in literary 
criticism where first-hand accounts of authorial intention are either unavailable 
or unnecessary to complete the text.
We know from theoretical work this century in literary theory that any text 
permits a wide range of readings, from the highly constructive and politically 
charitable to the deconstructive and politically eisogetic, especially when the reader 
approaches a seemingly definitive text (such as a recorded judgment) as being 
infinitely permeable, and in fact, just one set of co-ordinates on a larger map of 
discourse. This all makes it rather hard to maintain one’s bearings. There is a 
way, however, to ensure stability in the work of review and interpretation and that 
is to control both the writing and the criticism -  in other words, keep the mass in 
Latin. In this matter it is, for the most part, others cut from the same cloth, or 
judges who serve as official literary critics. In other words, here we find that the 
same class of authors are the critics -  judges judging judgments. This is 
transparently a form of literary criticism which will permit only the most cautious 
and politically acceptable interpretations.
The majority view of the Inquiry Committee read the Reference decision as 
allowing disturbing impressions to be created to the public which, if they did not 
criticize them, would lead to impaired public confidence.17 This is far from 
public scrutiny -  it is an exercise in textual criticism of the Reference judges’ 
obiter dicta which strives for an interpretation just critical enough to restore public 
confidence. This is all that can be mustered by the Law because to make judges 
publicly account for their reasons for judgment, in any circumstances, we learn 
from Madam Justice McLachlin in the Supreme Court of Canada “would be to 
strike at the most sacrosanct core of judicial independence.”18 The constraints
^ r .  Justice Coiy, in MacKeigan v. Hickman suggests that judicial immunity may not be absolute in 
matters of court administration and finds that it may be lifted where “it is necessary to reaffirm public 
confidence in the administration of justice.” {supra note 5 at 705). While some sense of context, albeit 
limited, creeps into his reasons, it was lost on the Supreme Court and the Inquiry Committee. In the 
Inquiry Committee Report, Chief Justice Allan MacEachem assures us that in our best of possible legal 
systems the lack of accountability for judicial utterances is fairly purchased by a corresponding 
principle restricting judicial commentary out-of-court (after-the-text).
17Supra, note 2 at 36.
®Two of the Marshall justices, MacKeigan C J. and Pace J A.., averted the quest for vindication (one 
left the Bench due to ill-health, the other retired). The Inquiry Committee took the view that it has 
no jurisdiction over ex-justices so nothing was said about their conduct.
on interpretation are formidable -  the priesthood must remain in tact.
The battleground of responsibility for error and its cruel consequences for the 
Marshall family then became one of respecting judicial immunity versus restoring 
public confidence. With these political commitments it is not surprising that no 
serious review of the Reference judges’ comments on their responsibility for error 
was undertaken by the Inquiry Committee. Mindful of the preeminence of judicial 
immunity, the Inquiry Committee considers how much (or how little) of the 
Reference text should be critically questioned in order to satisfy so-called “public 
confidence” (read, “public complicity” or “public mystification”) in the judiciary.
The authors/judges vigorously resist any moment of interpretation which 
would require them to suggest that to make them address their comments would 
create a situation wherein they are more sinned against than sinning: if they did 
err in the first place, as the Chair of the Inquiry Committee suspects they did not 
in his dissenting reasons, they certainly cannot be expected to publicly explain how 
or why. This would compromise them and more importantly, it would compro­
mise the Law itself -  the doctrine of judicial immunity would be violated.
The doctrine of judicial immunity is paramount to accepting responsibility for 
perceived errors or explaining why harsh and ill-informed words were used. 
Those are political matters which judges supposedly are above and by virtue of 
judicial immunity their role must be preserved even in the face of public criticism. 
Just as Captain Vere pronounces in the hasty trial of Billy Budd that “mindful of 
paramount obligations, I strive against scruple that may tend to enervate 
decision,”19 the Law cannot enervate itself in dealing with the both real and 
apparent political and moral error in the Reference decision. The judges are only 
too aware of the fact that to pause to consider scruple or compel accountability 
would demystify the Law’s social magic and their tragi—comic wizardly role. There 
can be no criticism of the Law beyond itself and hence no move outside of its 
discursive fram ew ork; only internal and controlled (by juries of their peers) 
doctrinal struggles can be whipped up when alleged errors arise.
The entire affair is revealing because, unlike the promise we tend to associate 
with literary criticism, the liberating play of meanings and the virtues of diverse 
readings of particular texts, the Law’s words have a political finality. When the 
book ends, or perhaps in the opening chapter, the prison door is locked. 
Interpretation after the fact is only self—justificatory. It is not a free or liberating 
play of meanings; certain interpretations are privileged and these are backed up
with violence (the gun, the prison, the stigma). In such a highly politicized (and 
violent) discourse, one tenet mercifully required should be a willingness to accept 
and examine fallibility. Yet, we see in the Marshall saga no open acceptance of 
error, nor readings of the judgments sensitive to the need to cause the powerful 
to answer for their wrongful wielding of it. We have to ask ourselves after 
Marshall, how a (fallen) legal world deals with the innocence? In a complex way, 
we can see from the judges’ behaviour at the Inquiry Committee that the Law 
seemed to face a choice: either tarnish the innocent (so they don’t seem too 
innocent in contrast to those committing error), hence deflecting any anticipated 
criticism of itself, or ignore the innocence by retreating -  leaving only the innocent 
to transact in a world of accountability, pleading their case tacitly by rem ain ing  
dignified.
There may be societal justification for a very limited immunity of judges, but 
not absolute immunity, self-serving non-culpability. In a democracy, only the will 
of the people is absolute — not the Law or its judges. While technically judges ran 
be censured or removed for gross misconduct, the basis for review of judges is so 
narrow and statutory provision so vague20 that little serious review has ever been 
conducted as illustrated by the Marshall case. Reports are occasionally written 
criticizing judicial conduct, but it is difficult to characterize any of them as more 
than internal wrist-slapping.21 There are no publicly established standards for 
judicial behaviour, and, as any lawyer knows, when you regulate your own 
profession an argument can be made to your friends (other judges) that almost 
any type of behaviour need not be justified publicly.
The marginalization of the outsider, Donald Marshall, Jr., in the Inquiry 
Committee review process was apparent from the outset. As the Inquiry 
commenced and once again serious aspersions were cast on his character, Mr. 
Marshall was without representation, without a voice. Marshall was forced to 
revisit the shame and damage caused in 1983 after the Reference decision 
allegations. Just as his early efforts to be compensated were shadowed by the dark 
cloud hanging over him after the Reference reasons, having been completely 
vindicated by the Royal Commission Report, once again his efforts to rebuild his 
life with honour and public recognition of his innocence was undermined at the 
Inquiry Committee hearing. Furthermore, the contention presented during the 
Judicial Inquiry Committee proceedings, that the singling out of the Reference
^Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-l, s. 65.
21I do not doubt for a moment that the judges whose comments were criticized were highly offended 
by the conclusions of the Inquiry Committee majority report. The majority committee members 
would be seen as “traitors” of sorts in the world of judicial etiquette. However, this world is so 
narrow and incestuous that study of the internal repercussions hardly seems politically relevant.
judges could be seen as a greater miscarriage of justice than that experienced by 
Mr. Marshall is nothing short of obscenity. How can anyone compare the 
“ordeal” of public accountability to eleven years of unjust imprisonment and 
subsequent public humiliation?
The most revealing aspect of the Judicial Council Inquiry Committee’s report 
on the Marshall Judges is Chief Justice MacEachern’s separate opinion. As 
Chairperson of the Committee, this opinion carries some obvious weight. It also 
serves to undermine the exceedingly moderate criticism of the majority opinion. 
Chief Justice MacEachem’s opinion is that of the apologist for the Law, the 
defender of its unfair victimization and the purveyor of a philosophy of unbridled 
judicial freedom. While the majority opinion can be characterized as striving for 
middle ground, aiming to re-establish public (blind?) faith in the judiciary while 
preserving notions of immunity, the Chairperson’s opinion assumes the high 
ground, aiming to discredit those whose faith is faltering, while enshrining the 
priestly status of judges. He finds that the Royal Commission was wrong on most 
points in its criticism of the Marshall Reference judges. Indeed, in support of the 
judges’ conduct, Chief Justice MacEachern offers that “there were legitimate 
reasons for the court to lay some of the responsibility for this misfortune on Mr. 
Marshall.”22
Chief Justice MacEachern defends the judges’ damaging language, elevating 
their right of expression to a guarded norm “...if judges are expected to speak 
openly, directly and bluntly about matters that may be of public importance, then 
we must be very careful indeed before we dilute that principle.”23 The Chair of 
the Committee does not report the general principle of judicial license in the 
particular context of the Marshall affair, nor does he offer evidence as to the 
“public importance” of the devastating comments in question. Instead, we are 
escorted to the realm of dogma where there is little room for the aberrant 
incidents of personal tragedy.
The message delivered to the public and Marshall himself in Chief Justice 
MacEachern’s opinion is simple and not unlike Melville’s characterization of the 
sailor’s life in Billy Budd: “every sailor [citizen] too, is accustomed to obey orders 
without debating them; his life afloat is externally ruled for him.”24 This is the 
image Chief Justice MacEachern projects of the citizenry — the judges perform
22Supra, note 3 at 22.
*Ibid. at 25.
24Supra, note 11 at 364.
their elevated role (in the public service and as a matter of presumed public 
importance) and everyone else owes fealty to them because they are judges.
The arrogance of the notion of immunity and a doctrine of an unbridled 
judicial right to say openly what is deemed in the “public interest” -  and to not 
speak the whole truth if so inclined — is compounded when we realize that in the 
Marshall case we are examining a miscarriage of justice of an aboriginal person. 
As an aboriginal person, the criminal justice appeal system is an alien one and the 
judiciary is seen as an offensive colonial symbol having only might as its source of 
authority. The presence of racism in the handling of the Marshall case was one 
of the Royal Commission’s most disturbing findings. Yet, there is no sensitivity 
shown in the Inquiry Committee Report toward the need to develop some 
measure of Mikmaq or aboriginal confidence in the judicial system. Surely a final 
opportunity to begin healing the wounds inflicted through abuse of the Grand 
Chiefs son has been missed. The Mikmaq dimension of the case was lost in the 
Law talk because Law talk is exclusionary colonial talk.25
In this regard, it seems ironic that the separate opinion is as much an act of 
self-judging by Chief Justice MacEachern as it is an apology (as in apologetics) 
for the Marshall judges. Chief Justice MacEachern must vigorously come to the 
defence of the Marshall Reference judges with charitable interpretations because 
of what he has authored himself — in other words, he must construct his own 
defence. Chief Justice MacEachern’s obdurate decision in the recent Gitksan 
case26 inflamed aboriginal people across the country by his suggestion that, 
among other things, aboriginal life was nasty, brutish and short and that the 
Gitksan did not exhibit sufficient civilization to exercise dominion over property. 
Unfortunately, the nasty, brutish and short pronouncement, coming from such a 
position of power, is a truth-producing falsehood: that is, its utterance contributes 
to its accuracy in characterizing the lives of aboriginal peoples. One wonders what 
important public service is performed by blunt, culturally insensitive judicial 
language (except the maintenance of a crumbling colonial legal regime).
All aboard the Bellipotent?
2SThe Canadian system does not in anyway currently reflect aboriginal law; not in structure, process, 
substance, language, nor punishments.
26Delgamuukw e ta lv .  British Columbia et al. (1991), 79 D .L R  (4th) 185 (B.CS.C).
